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Abstract
 
The sub-Saharan African region is often considered the most corrupt in the world and has 
been characterised by macroeconomic instability; several countries have experienced out 
of control inflation in recent years. Corruption, defined as the abuse of public power for 
private gain discourages enterprise and investment, and encourages capital flight and rent-
seeking; all of which increase the difficulty of raising tax revenue. The difficulty in 
collecting taxes can establish powerful motives for governments to turn to the printing 
presses in order to generate seigniorage, which in turn causes inflation. 
The aim of this thesis is to determine whether corruption and inflation are correlated in 
thirty six countries in sub-Saharan Africa over the period 2001-2011. This will be achieved 
through econometric panel regression analysis and by theoretical analysis of the 
mechanisms by which the relationship occurs. Our findings demonstrate that corruption 
has a statistically significant reinforcing effect on inflation in sub-Saharan Africa. This is 
ostensibly due to the negative effects of corruption on the ability of governments to fund 
public expenditure thus creating motives for seigniorage which can in turn cause inflation. 
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1.1 Introduction 
This opening chapter introduces the topic and objective of the thesis, highlighting the 
relevance of the study.  A delimitation and thesis outline follow. 
 
Human development in sub-Saharan Africa has made huge leaps in recent years during the 
continent’s slow and painful transition from warzone to an increasingly prosperous region. 
Booming economic growth has alleviated poverty in some countries and living standards 
have risen by 30% in the last decade. At the end of the Cold War there were only three 
democracies in sub-Saharan Africa, now the number stands at twenty five. Despite the 
varying legitimacy of these governments the development is positive; presently only four 
countries in the region lack multi-party constitutions. The varying shades of government 
bureaucracy and fast changing socioeconomic environment have put immense strain on 
underdeveloped institutions and their ability to regulate the economy. (The Economist, 
2013a) 
 
This study of corruption and inflation focuses on sub-Saharan Africa since the region is one 
of the world’s most corrupt (Svensson, 2005), and further since several countries in the 
region have experienced very high- or hyperinflation during the reference period (World 
Bank, 2013). Political instability and war have taken their toll on the administrative 
capabilities and finances of the countries and many countries have underdeveloped 
government apparatuses as a result of fairly recent independence and nascent nation 
building.  All these preceding factors make the region an interesting object for study. The 
future prosperity of the region will be dependent on a stable macroeconomy and reduced 
corruption that will provide conditions for a sustainable business environment and tax 
revenue growth. (The Economist, 2013c) 
 
The relationship between inflation and corruption has been documented by various 
studies, giving both economic and political explanations for their relationship. This paper 
will attempt to empirically prove a correlation between these two phenomena and 
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highlight certain possible ways in which corruption affects inflation. Though the direction 
of the causal link is unclear, we have chosen to use inflation as the dependent variable in 
our analysis.  
Regression analysis may prove a correlation between inflation and corruption; however it 
provides no insights into how they are connected or the direction of the causality. Using the 
political-economy approach it is possible to theorise about the relationship: one possible 
explanation is that corrupt governments actively allow inflation when pursuing motives to 
generate seigniorage: embezzlement fuelled deficits, difficulties in tax collection especially 
with regard to the parallel economy and corruption (and inflation) induced capital flight. 
 
1.2 Objective 
The objective of this thesis is to determine whether a relationship exists between 
corruption and inflation in sub-Saharan Africa. The aim of the paper is to analyse how 
corruption in public administration affects inflation through a number of mechanisms 
including discouragement of enterprise and investment, capital flight and rent-seeking, all 
of which add to difficulties in raising tax revenues and thus establish motives for 
seigniorage. There is a wealth of literature on the negative macroeconomic effects of 
corruption and of inflation, however the relationship has not been fully analysed in this 
region; we aim to contribute to economic literature by analysing the phenomenon in sub-
Saharan Africa. It is especially relevant and timely to investigate this relationship at a time 
of booming economic growth in the region as a whole, which will best benefit the countries 
in question only when a stable macroeconomy and reduced corruption provide conditions 
for a sustainable business environment and tax revenue growth. 
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1.3 Delimitation 
Our study sample includes thirty six countries in sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 1). The 
original sample of forty seven countries was revised downwards to thirty six due to a lack 
of available data in some countries that otherwise would have been in scope. The time 
period has been limited to eleven years (2001-2011) due to large gaps in data for earlier 
years. Many prior panel data studies in the field have analysed a shorter time period and a 
similar or smaller cross-section. 
 
1.4 Thesis outline 
This thesis is presented as follows: Section 2 presents a short background on the sub-
Saharan African region. The following section presents previous studies and relevant 
theory. Section 4 describes our methodology and regression specification including 
explanations of our choice of variables. The empirical findings are presented in Section 5 
and are succeeded by analysis of our results and a concluding section that summarises our 
findings. 
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2 Background 
The regional situation with regard to corruption and inflation is presented briefly. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa is amongst the world’s least developed regions, with the majority of 
countries ranked near the bottom of all development indices. Much of the region has been 
ravaged by war and has until recently been characterised by low economic growth 
(Economist, 2013c). However the region is currently experiencing amongst the fastest 
economic growth in the world amid a commodity boom (Economist, 2013a); the projected 
average growth for the entire sub-Saharan African region is 5.25% annually in 2012-13 
(International Monetary Fund, 2012).  
 
With weak state institutions and an inefficient judicial system moderating the society, the 
economies have become a nightmare for those aiming to operate businesses in the region 
(Economist, 2013c). Often referred to as the world’s most corrupt region, sub-Saharan 
Africa is fraught with red-tape and rent-seeking government officials (Economist, 2013b). 
Entrepreneurs thinking of investing in sub-Saharan Africa are soon reminded why 
countries in the region are almost exclusively in the bottom third of the World Bank's “ease 
of doing business” index (Economist, 2013b) as a result FDI levels are very low in 
comparison with other regions. The mismanagement of government finances and the lack 
of transparency in all government activities have contributed to the creation of 
inhospitable financial environments and several countries have experienced hyperinflation 
in recent years (World Bank, 2013). 
 
During the 1990s the sub-Saharan region experienced roughly thirty armed conflicts a 
year, this prevalence has since dropped, but there are still currently a dozen armed 
conflicts in the region. During the same period the number of successful coups fell by 
roughly 65%. Though this progress is positive, the legacy of these conflicts and coups is 
unsustainable governance (Economist, 2013d). Corruption is widespread and many leaders 
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are not afraid to raid state coffers in order to enrich themselves. Bribery is so ubiquitous 
that it has become part of daily life, and to some degree socially acceptable. Public services 
are not “public” without first paying the correct bribes, ingraining rent-seeking in societal 
norms (Economist, 2013c). In many sub-Saharan African countries, peasant farmers take 
refuge in subsistence production, which is economically sub-optimal, so as to avoid 
corruption causing a consequent decline in overall agricultural productivity and living 
standards (Svensson, 2005).  
 
The graph below (Graph 1) provides an overview of the prevalence of inflation and 
corruption in a selection of sub-Saharan African countries. Botswana, with the lowest 
corruption also has relatively low inflation whereas Angola has both the highest corruption 
and inflation. However, Nigeria shows a different story with high corruption and very low 
inflation. 
Graph 1: Corruption and Inflation (2011) 
 
Source: Transparency International (2011)2 and World Bank (2013) 
                                               
2
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3 Literature review 
The following chapter presents the theoretical framework used in this thesis. Firstly previous 
academic studies that have contributed to the paper are discussed; thereafter relevant 
economic theory on the subject is presented. 
 
3.1 Previous Studies 
Rose-Ackerman’s (1975) research on corruption is the first extensive work in modern 
literature on the subject, and since publication has triggered extensive research into the 
costs and consequences of corruption in modern economies. Svensson (2005) further 
analyses the prevalence of corruption and seeks to understand its effects on the market 
structure; the analysis focuses on the effects of competition on corruption and also the 
possible positive relationship between corruption and economic growth due to a more 
flexible and less bureaucratic economy. Other studies (see Treisman, 1998; Ades and Di 
Tella, 1999 etc.) instead found that corruption increases in the face of weak political 
competition. 
 
Drawing on work by Rose-Ackerman on the effects of corruption on the market structure, 
Braun and Di Tella (2000) investigate the correlation between corruption and inflation 
variance. They found that high inflation variance disrupts market price mechanisms thus 
increasing the ability to charge non-market prices. The corrupt can take advantage of the 
difficulty to ascertain price information in order to seek rents. 
 
Blackburn and Powell (2011) found a correlation between inflation and corruption through 
theoretical modelling that attributed seigniorage, and thus inflation, to the growth-
impeding aspects of corruption. Their theory inferred that corruption has a long-term 
negative impact on economic growth as a result of the deterrent effect of inflation on 
investment. Similarly Blackburn, Neanidis and Haque (2008) empirically proved how 
corruption increases the need for governments to rely on seigniorage financing, thereby 
increasing inflation. Their main thesis analysed the ways in which corruption negatively 
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impacts economic growth, primarily due to the misallocation of skills and resources from 
productive to unproductive sectors and activities, impediments to doing business and the 
undermining of property rights which in turn discourage innovation and investment, both 
domestic and FDI. Both of the Blackburn (2008; 2011) studies found, in contrast to 
Svensson (2005) that corruption has a strong negative impact on economic growth through 
impediments to business and misallocation of resources. The World Bank (1997, p.14-15) 
further refutes the theory that corruption is “efficiency enhancing”. 
 
In the first systematic cross-country analysis of the relationship between corruption and 
inflation, Al-Mahrubi (2000) used a political economy approach to the determinants of 
inflation. He asserted that governments establish motives to create inflation through 
seigniorage due to the negative impact of corruption on tax revenue. The mechanism by 
which corruption affects tax revenue is: increased difficulties in tax collection, a growth in 
the parallel economy and a triggering of capital flight. This is further aggravated by 
increased deficits due to higher levels of public spending as a result of embezzlement. Al-
Marhubi’s (2000) study concluded the existence of a significant correlation between 
inflation and corruption in forty five Latin American and Asian countries. 
 
The negative correlation between corruption and the ability to generate tax revenue has 
been widely discussed (see Ghura, 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000; Imam and Jacobs, 2007) 
adding further weight to theories linking corruption and inflation tax. Samimi et al.’s 
(2012) research furthers this theory as they found a positive correlation between inflation 
tax and corruption, thus showing why seigniorage becomes an alternative source of 
funding as a result of the negative impact of corruption on the tax base. Their panel data 
regression model included Middle Eastern, North African and other developing countries. 
 
Akça et al. (2012) discuss the difficulty in establishing causality between inflation and 
corruption, a theme picked up on in many studies. Though arguing a two way relationship, 
Akça et al. (2012) chose corruption as the dependent variable and analysed the ways in 
which inflation and indicators of governance affect it. The study showed a statistically 
significant correlation between inflation and corruption in all three reference groups: 
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underdeveloped, developing and developed countries. They concluded, in accordance with 
Samimi et al. (2012), that an increase in inflation brings about an increase in corruption 
which they attribute to government seigniorage motives as a result of reduced tax revenue 
and inefficient fund allocation. Inflation, in turn, causes deterioration in both investment 
climate and income distribution which further incentivises corruption. 
 
Despite widespread research proclaiming and denouncing the negative macroeconomic 
consequences of both inflation and corruption, their effects on each other have not been 
fully understood. Al-Marhubi (2000), Akça et al. (2012) and Samimi et al. (2012) all 
emphasise the political-economy approach in highlighting the many ways in which 
corruption and inflation affect each other. All three studies use empirical evidence from a 
number of regions to further support the theory that countries often experience these twin 
ills in tandem. According to our research, previous studies have neglected to focus 
specifically on sub-Saharan Africa (though the Akça et al. (2012) study did include a few 
sub-Saharan African countries) and thus it is unproven whether the relationship between 
inflation and corruption holds for these countries in the same way. 
 
3.2 Theoretical framework 
3.2.1 Inflation 
Friedman (1963) argues that inflation is purely a monetary phenomenon derived from an 
increase in money supply. Though private banks have some limited possibility of creating 
money, governments have a near-monopoly. Furthermore, printing money is a source of 
revenue to governments. At a fundamental level government expenditure can only be 
funded through taxes or borrowing, the printing of money must therefore be one of the 
two. To the extent that money printing does not raise prices it constitutes borrowing; the 
public issues zero interest loans to the government. However, when money printing raises 
the general price level it levies a so-called inflation tax on cash balances. (Friedman, 1963) 
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3.2.2 Optimal seigniorage 
Schulze (2000) states that seigniorage is the ability for the money printing monopolist to 
generate revenue through the differential in the real and perceived value of fiat money. In 
effect the monopolist can exchange banknotes for real goods, given that the population is 
willing or forced to hold and use the currency (Schulze, 2000, p. 36-40). The theory of 
optimal seigniorage, as defined by Mankiw (1987), postulates that governments aim to 
reduce societal deadweight losses by using the optimal mix of revenue streams. One form 
of revenue is tax on output and the other seigniorage. The deadweight losses incurred by 
the inflationary effects of seigniorage are of two types: the first are direct costs, such as 
increased menu costs that affect firms as a result of changing nominal prices; the term is 
derived from the textbook example of businesses having to reprint menus. The second 
category is that of the costs associated with disruption and reduced efficiency in markets 
(Mankiw, 1987). Capital controls, or legislation that makes local currency the only legal 
tender, are examples of measures that increase the ability to use seigniorage (Schulze, 
2000, p. 36-40). 
 
3.2.3 Suppressed inflation 
According to Friedman (1963) suppressed inflation occurs when the government “attempts 
to suppress the manifestations of the inflationary pressure by controlling prices, exchange 
rates, and other magnitudes” (p. 25). In its extreme, suppressed inflation leads to the 
establishment of a widespread underground economy where new forms of money are 
created and the economy regresses to a bartering system. Suppressed inflation can be 
harmful as it wipes out the price mechanism, which is widely credited with achieving the 
most efficient allocation of resources (p. 31). Businesses in such environments face 
difficulties such as excess supply and liquidity issues due to the economy’s inability to 
reach demand/supply equilibrium (Friedman, 1963). Mankiw (1987) notes that inflation 
tax may be the only way of taxing economic activity that takes place in the underground 
economy.  
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3.2.4 Corruption 
Despite the non-existence of a universal definition, the World Bank (1997) suggests 
corruption be defined as “abuse of public office for private gain” (p. 8). According to 
Svensson (2005), corruption can be seen as a fee or a tax that creates disparity between the 
actual and perceived marginal product of capital. Corruption is however not a tax as it does 
not contribute to state coffers but causes higher transaction costs due to secrecy and 
uncertainty. Corruption in the public domain has consequences that reach beyond the 
misappropriation of public funds: the investment climate, market signals and social trust 
all suffer. Through corruption, market signals and thus the price mechanism central to 
market transfer become skewed: this increases transaction costs and creates incentives for 
black market trading as pricing becomes more opaque (Braun and Di Tella, 2000). Further 
costs caused by corruption are the social costs of inefficient allocation of “talent, technology 
and capital away from their socially most productive uses” (Svensson, 2005, p. 37). This 
affects business adversely as entrepreneurs reduce their investments or move to the 
parallel sector. Transaction costs associated with reduced social trust can have further 
negative effects on economic growth as they also discourage trade (Svensson, 2005). 
 
The negative effects of corruption on the investment climate discourage all types of 
investment as corruption can lead to questionable property rights and increased monetary 
costs of bribes, red tape etc. (Svensson, 2005). This can in turn induce capital flight, both 
monetary and human as the business and social environment is deemed too risky for 
investment (Blackburn, Neanidis and Haque, 2008). Corruption also has detrimental effects 
on government finances due to the monetary costs of inflation, and the drain on the 
economy caused by corrupt officials’ embezzlement (World Bank, 1997). 
 
3.2.5 Mechanism linking corruption and inflation 
All the effects listed above reduce economic output and the tax base. In accordance with the 
theory put forward by Al-Mahrubi (2000), corruption decreases the ability of governments 
to fund public activities; creating the need for alternative sources of funding. This could 
incentivise further corruption, or else seigniorage could become an attractive revenue 
source (Blackburn, Neanidis and Haque, 2008). Milton Friedman famously said that 
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inflation is the one form of taxation that can be imposed without legislation, which is why it 
is often the resort of governments experiencing difficulties in raising tax in conventional 
ways (Friedman, 1963, p. 16). Governments can avoid raising unpopular direct taxes and 
use seigniorage as an indirect inflation tax, in effect causing both the currency and the 
population’s assets to depreciate (Akça et al., 2012).  
 
Al-Mahrubi (2000) theorises that the relationship between corruption and inflation stems 
from motives for governments to create seigniorage in order to fund public expenditure. 
Corruption has manifest effects on the tax base; tax evasion and tax collection costs are 
likely to be higher in corrupt economies, furthermore the tendency for firms to go 
underground in order to avoid corruption incentivises usage of inflation tax. Economic 
growth, and investment, suffer as a result of corruption thus reducing the tax base and 
thereby government revenue. Finally, corruption contributes to inflation as it exacerbates 
financial deficits as a result of increased public expenditure. (Al-Mahrubi, 2000) 
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4 Methodology 
This chapter presents a detailed description of how this study was conducted. Firstly, the sample 
of countries, data collection and empirical specification are presented. Secondly, we present a 
comprehensive explanation of all included variables and their relevance for the study. Lastly the 
econometric approach and method are thoroughly explained. 
 
4.1 Methodological approach 
4.1.1 Sample of countries 
The thirty six countries included in our dataset are all from the sub-Saharan region of 
Africa (see Table 1); the original sample of forty seven was revised downwards due to lack 
of data. 
Table 1: Sample of countries including income group as of 2011 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2013) 
Low income Lower middle income Upper middle income 
Benin Cameroon Angola 
Burkina Faso Republic of Congo Botswana 
Burundi Cote d’Ivoire Gabon 
Chad Ghana Mauritius 
Democratic Rep of Congo Lesotho Namibia 
Eritrea Nigeria Seychelles 
Ethiopia Senegal South Africa 
The Gambia Sudan 
Kenya Swaziland 
Madagascar Zambia 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Sierra Leone 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zimbabwe 
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4.1.2 Data collection 
The data collected in this paper is classified as secondary data and was compiled by the 
World Bank and Transparency International as part of the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) respectively. The data series covers an 
eleven year period ranging from 2001 to 2011. Other secondary data used throughout this 
paper derives from Google Scholar, Elin@Lund (Lund University’s electronic database) and 
Discovery Search (The University of Melbourne’s electronic database). 
 
4.1.3 Empirical specification 
Our analysis will be constructed using a multiple regression model and specified as follows; 
 
 yit = β0+ui+ et+β1*x1it+β2*x2it+β3*x3it+β4*x4it+β5*x5it+εit 
INFLATIONit=β0+ui+et+β1*CORRUPTIONit+β2*FDI/GDPit+β3*OPENNESSit+β4*GDPGROWTHit+β5*GDP/CAPITAit+εit 
 
The index, i, denotes the cross-sectional unit ranging from 1-36 for the different countries, t 
is the time period index (2001-2011) and y is the dependent variable, inflation. β0 is the 
intercept and β1-5 denote the estimated coefficients for the independent variables, x1-5. The 
independent variables are: Corruption, Openness, FDI (% of GDP), GDP growth and 
GDP/capita. The residual term is denoted, ε. Section 4.3.2 will explain the use of the fixed 
effects model which inserts dummies for period and cross section respectively; these are 
denoted et and ui. Note that the time period dummy is dependent solely on the time index 
and the cross-section solely on the cross-sectional unit index. 
 
We will be using the least squares estimator on a panel regression model with fixed effects, 
as described above. The model will be unbalanced due to gaps in the data; however we 
deemed this to be a better option than creating an artificially balanced dataset. The reason 
for this is that corruption and/or inflation may have contributed to the lack of data; 
therefore eliminating the unbalanced data would perhaps have caused a bias. Unbalanced 
data is not a problem in itself, yet has the potential to make it more difficult to reach 
significant results (Dougherty, 2011, p. 515). 
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4.2 Variables 
4.2.1 Inflation 
According to Burda and Wyplosz (2009) inflation can be defined as “the sustained increase 
in prices over longer periods of time, as measured by the rate of change in a price index” (p. 
281). Inflation is a fairly new occurrence and was practically unheard of prior to the 
implementation of fiat money in the modern economic system (Burda and Wyplosz, 2009, 
p. 281). The variable used in this study is inflation as measured by the annual growth rate 
of the GDP implicit deflator; a World Bank development indicator. It shows the rate of price 
change in the domestic economy as a whole by calculating the ratio of GDP in current local 
currency to GDP in constant local currency (World Bank, 2013). The GDP deflator was 
chosen, in preference to the Consumer Price Index, as it is a less volatile measure and as it 
only measures domestic price-levels. In addition it facilitates cross country comparison as 
it is not bound to a country specific basket of goods and services. 
 
4.2.2 Corruption 
The most widely accepted deﬁnition of corruption is: the “abuse of public ofﬁce for private 
gain” (World Bank, 1997, p. 8). Measuring levels of corruption is difficult as the 
phenomenon is expressed uniquely in various transactions; corruption is rooted in a 
country's political, bureaucratic and social institutions (World Bank, 1997, p. 8).  However 
indices of corruption levels have been created through a series of surveys which use 
perceptions of corruption collected by reputable institutions. In this paper we will use the 
Transparency International (TI) “Corruption Perceptions Index”. TI compiles a composite 
index every year measuring the perceived corruption (CPI) in the public sector, and is the 
most widely used and respected corruption index. Countries are ranked between 0-100 
with 0 representing a highly corrupt public sector and 100 a public sector free from 
corruption (Transparency International, 2013). The index scale has been inverted in order 
to produce more easily comprehensible results: a higher score represents a higher level of 
corruption and vice-versa. 
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4.2.3 FDI as a percentage of GDP 
Foreign direct investment, “FDI (% of GDP)” is included as a variable as it is believed to act 
as an indicator of investment climate, and a proxy for both investor confidence - and to 
some degree corruption - in public administration. Investment is considered risky in the 
face of institutional inefficiency due to deficient or unenforceable property rights, 
underdeveloped judicial systems and uncertainty. We predict a negative correlation 
between inflation and FDI (% of GDP) as a result of the poor investment climate. Inflation is 
detrimental to capital as it acts as an inflation tax on cash balances. FDI (% of GDP) as an 
indicator of investor confidence and institutional efficiency is predicted to exhibit a 
negative relationship with inflation due to the supposed relationship between 
macroeconomic stability and low inflation. As FDI (% of GDP) acts as a proxy for corruption 
the correlation between inflation and FDI will provide further insights in to the 
relationship between inflation and corruption. 
 
FDI is the net inflow of investment in an enterprise operating in a foreign economy. It is the 
sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term 
capital as shown in the balance of payments (World Bank, 2013). We calculated FDI’s share 
of GDP by dividing FDI (current US dollars) with GDP (current US dollars), and thereafter 
multiplying by 100. Data has been collected from the World Bank development indicators. 
 
4.2.4 Openness 
Openness, like FDI, acts as an indicator of ease of doing business and accessibility from and 
to external markets. The correlation between inflation and openness is predicted to be 
negative in so far as high inflation tends to make for a poor investment climate. However, 
openness also increases vulnerability to external markets through demand for domestic 
currency and reliance on foreign trade (Loayza and Raddatz, 2006). A country that is 
heavily reliant on imports could experience imported inflation due to rising price-levels 
abroad, or could experience deflationary effects due to capital outflow. A country with an 
export based economy sees substantial inflows of foreign currency and could experience 
inflation due to increased money supply (Friedman, 1963). For these reasons Openness 
could have a positive relationship with inflation. The actual correlation between Openness 
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and inflation is therefore difficult to predict; it is to be hoped that regression analysis will 
provide insights. 
 
Openness is measured as the sum of the import and export percentages of GDP divided by 
100. This data was compiled using the World Bank (2013) development indicators for the 
percentages of GDP that correspond to imports and exports. The Openness measure has the 
range 0-2, whereby 0 denotes no imports/exports and 2 denotes imports and exports equal 
to 100% of GDP respectively. 
 
4.2.5 GDP/capita 
GDP/capita is calculated by dividing GDP (in current US dollars) by the midyear population. 
“The GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus 
any taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products” (World Bank, 
2013). GDP/capita is included as a variable in this study to control for the countries’ 
developmental levels, as inflation levels tend to vary with the country’s stage of 
development. It also acts as a proxy for functioning institutions as these are often linked to 
wealth accumulation. The reason for using this proxy variable instead of some form of 
institutional index is to avoid multicollinearity with corruption and due to the inherent 
problems of indices based on perceptions (Bardhan, 1997). 
 
4.2.6 GDP growth  
GDP growth is defined as the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based 
on constant local currency while aggregates are based on constant 2000 US dollars (World 
Bank, 2013). GDP growth is included as a control variable that is expected to show a 
positive correlation with inflation. The two variables should grow at a fairly equal pace in a 
society characterised by a stable macroeconomy due to inflation expectations and rational 
wage demands (Friedman, 1977). 
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4.3 Econometrics 
4.3.1 Panel data 
The emergence of panel data in modern economics has enabled simultaneous analysis of 
time series and cross-sectional data. By enabling observation of the same units over several 
different time periods, analysis of certain economic phenomena has become much more 
accessible (Kennedy, 2003, p. 301). A typical trait of panel data is large numbers of cross-
sectional units observed over a shorter period of time.  In our paper we will study 
observations from thirty six sub-Saharan African countries over an eleven year period. 
Kennedy (2003) recognises that compiling panel data is very expensive, thus one could 
speculate that the frequent data-gaps in several sub-Saharan countries are due to 
budgetary restrictions on the data gathering institutions. 
 
Panel data analysis has several advantages in comparison to traditional time-series and 
cross-sectional data analysis. Panel data has the ability to deal with heterogeneity in the 
unmeasured variables3 that determine the dependent variable, correcting them and thus 
creating an unbiased estimation of the omitted variables (Kennedy, 2003, p. 302). Panel 
data also creates more variability in the data set as more combinations are produced given 
the variation over time and variation of specific units, reducing issues of multicollinearity. 
As discussed in the previous paragraph panel data allows one to view the dynamics of the 
variables as it tracks a common sample of units over several years. It also has the ability to 
better address the analysis of dynamic adjustment, thus it reduces the need for long time 
series of data (Kennedy, 2003, p. 302). 
 
4.3.2 Fixed versus random effects 
The heterogeneity in the unmeasured variables in cross-sectional data has the tendency to 
require different intercepts for each country (Kennedy, 2003, p. 303). If this need is not 
satisfied it can cause the LS (least squares) estimator to become biased as the unmeasured 
variables are correlated with the explanatory variables. To tackle this problem two 
                                               
3
 For more information on micro units/unmeasured variables see Kennedy, (2003) “A Guide to 
Econometrics”, p. 302. 
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methods have been suggested which aim to improve the estimation by modelling a 
different intercept for each cross-sectional unit. 
 
The fixed effects model allows each country to have a different intercept by adding a 
dummy for each. The effect of the dummy on the estimation protects against the LS-bias 
discussed in the previous paragraph. This transformation creates what is commonly 
referred to as the fixed effect estimator and transforms the LS-estimator in order to 
produce the desired slope of estimates (Kennedy, 2003, p. 303). However the fixed effects 
model comes with drawbacks; introducing a substantial amount of dummies in the 
estimation reduces the degrees of freedom leaving only one degree (the intercept has no 
dummy), causing a loss in efficiency of the estimation. The transformation also eliminates 
all explanatory variables that do not vary within an individual (Kennedy, 2003, p. 304). 
This elimination is however only problematic with time-invariant variables such as gender, 
race etc.; as our model does not include any such variables this problem will not affect the 
outcome of the relevant calculations. 
 
The random effects model, like the fixed effects model, allows different intercepts, but the 
model is designed to avoid the drawbacks of the fixed effects model. The model can be 
likened to drawing possible intercepts at random from a bowl of candidates; this causes 
them to be treated as if they were part of an error term. Kennedy (2003) states that as a 
result “we have a specification in which there is an overall intercept, a set of explanatory 
variables with coefficients of interest, and a composite error term” (p. 304). The random 
effects estimator thus makes part of the error term constant over the time period while 
other parts change for each period. However the random effects model also comes with 
drawbacks; there is a risk that the composite error term is correlated with the explanatory 
variables. Performing a Hausman test (see Table 2) will establish whether or not this is the 
case (Kennedy, 2003, p. 304).  
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4.3.3 Econometric considerations 
In the analysis of panel data several problems must be guarded for in the regressions as the 
data may be affected by multicollinearity, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Other 
factors that should be considered are the normal distribution of the residuals and the 
possible misspecification of the model as well as linearity issues. Several tests have been 
developed which test for the existence of the above mentioned phenomena. If proved to 
exist the model will not fulfil the Gauss-Markow assumption as it will not be BLUE (best 
linear unbiased estimator).  If present, the above mentioned problems will reduce the 
efficiency of the least squares estimator (Westerlund, 2005). 
 
Normal distribution of the residuals is needed for the estimator to be BLUE, however if the 
data set is large enough with large amounts of observations (N) and a small time period (t), 
the need to correct for normality in the residuals is not necessary. One method for 
normality adjustment is to create dummies which eradicate extreme values and outliers 
(Westerlund, 2005). Non-linearity in the model reduces the efficiency of the estimator and 
can therefore require re-specification. It is tested through graphical analysis or regression 
analysis with squared variables (Westerlund, 2005). 
 
When testing for multicollinearity it is important to highlight the innate strengths of panel 
data. As explained in the previous section (4.3.1) panel data combines the variation across 
countries with the variation over time. This creates more variability, thereby reducing the 
risk of multicollinearity and creating a more efficient estimator (Kennedy, 2003). One way 
of examining the occurrence of multicollinearity is by studying the correlation between the 
explanatory variables (see Table 4); a rule of thumb is to address the problem of 
multicollinearity if the correlation exceeds 0.8, where 1.0 suggests a perfect correlation 
(Westerlund, 2005, p. 160).  
 
When using time-series data it is common to encounter autocorrelation as data of this type 
tends to be correlated with its previous values (Westerlund, 2005, p. 185). The effects of 
autocorrelation cause the observations to lose independence as the covariance between the 
residuals is significantly different from 0.  If autocorrelation is present, the effect on the LS-
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estimator will be a loss of efficiency; the estimator is no longer BLUE. The variance-
covariance-matrix will give incorrect results causing the estimator inference to be 
misleading (Westerlund, 2005, p. 185). To test for autocorrelation in our model we will use 
the Durbin-Watson test. The Durbin-Watson test is constructed using 2(1-p) where p is the 
correlation between the residuals. The range is between 4 and 0, the value 2 indicating no 
trace of autocorrelation; values close to 4 and 0 indicate autocorrelation (Westerlund, 
2005). 
 
Unit roots may affect the outcome of our regression if the stochastic process is non-
stationary, causing the LS-estimator to lose efficiency. A high R2 value in combination with 
a low Durbin-Watson statistic and high t-statistic values indicate the presence of unit roots 
(Kennedy, 2003). 
 
Heteroskedasticity is a major concern if present in the LS-estimation. Much like 
autocorrelation, the impact of heteroskedasticity on the estimator is loss of efficiency. 
Thereby the estimator will not have the lowest variability (not BLUE) and the estimator 
inference will also be misleading, as the variance-covariance-matrix is incorrect 
(Westerlund, 2005, p. 173).  
 
To correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation one could create robustness through 
the Prais-Winsten approach; creating robustness in the standard errors by weighting the 
equation using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) on the cross-section. PCSE was 
chosen as it is optimal for creating robustness when the cross-section is larger than the 
time period. PCSE improves the PLS (panel least squares) standard errors, thus correcting 
the standard errors with respect to panel heteroskedasticity and the possible correlation of 
the standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995; 2004). Beck and Katz (1995) state that “PCSEs 
dominate OLS standard errors; when PCSEs are not necessary, they perform as well as the 
OLS standard errors, and when OLS standard errors perform poorly, PCSEs still perform 
well” (Beck and Katz, 1995, p. 641). Furthermore, the PCSE model performs better than the 
Huber-White formula in calculating robust standard errors as it estimates variation within 
clusters due to the recognition of a common variance structure within a cluster. In that way 
Page 26 of 51 
 
PCSE utilises information that the Huber-White formula neglects in only measuring 
variation between clusters (Johnson, 2004). 
 
Another pertinent problem is that of endogeneity; the direction of causality between the 
dependent and independent variables. Typically causality is tested by a Granger test 
(Dougherty, 2011) however this is not possible for panel data in the data program used 
(EViews 7.1).  
 
4.3.4 Robustness tests 
Robustness tests are performed to validate results obtained through our model. Ways to 
create robustness include inserting various dummies, using alternative measures of 
variables or creating an artificially balanced panel. Appropriate methods for this model 
include balancing the panel as the data is unbalanced to a great extent, and dividing the 
sample countries into different groups based on income level. 
 
To create the balanced panel in order to test for robustness we entirely excluded countries 
that lacked any observation for any variable during our specified time period (2001-2011). 
This created a panel consisting of twelve countries4, thus eradicating two thirds of the 
cross-sectional observations in the original sample of thirty six (see Table 7); this balanced 
panel is representative of the income distribution in the original sample. The second 
robustness test constituted dividing the original thirty six country sample into groups 
based on income level as of year 2011 (see Table 8), as defined by the World Bank. One 
group consisted of lower income countries (53% of the sample), one group comprised of 
lower middle income countries (28%) and lastly a group of upper middle income countries 
(19%) (see Table 1 and Graph 4). 
 
 
 
                                               
4 Botswana, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe. 
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4.4 Research methodology 
4.4.1 Reliability 
In order for this research to be reliable, two considerations must be made. Firstly the data 
collected must derive from reliable sources and secondly the research process must be 
done in a consistent way. Our study utilises annual data from the World Bank and 
Transparency International from the time period 2001-2011. The research has been 
conducted in a clear, structured and consistent manner throughout the process, enabling 
replication of the study. All data was processed in Microsoft Excel 2007 and later imported 
into EViews 7.1 to conduct the intended regressions. 
 
The study analyses the sub-Saharan region and data is therefore restricted to countries in 
this area.  Similar studies have used the same approach with regard to data sources and 
achieved good results, further increasing the reliability of our data sample. The research 
and data processing has been conducted with precision and caution in order to limit 
calculation errors which may have had implications for the study.  
 
4.4.2 Validity 
The validity of the subject is of utmost importance and concerns the degree of “truth” in 
our research. If the study does not reflect reality the validity of the study is of concern. The 
validity of the results is a product of the data. The data used in this study is therefore highly 
associated with the topic and has been gathered through reliable channels and handled 
with precision. The validity in our analysis stems from an objective review of relevant 
economic theory and the implementation of these theories on our data. As this study has 
been conducted in line with previous studies, there is little reason to suspect validity issues 
in the analysis. 
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4.4.3 Source criticism 
The sources used throughout this paper include old and new articles retrieved from Google 
Scholar, ELIN@Lund and Discovery Search. The publishing dates of the articles vary, with 
some articles having been published in the early 1960s while others have been published 
in recent years. By including old and new articles the subject gains a wider perspective as 
the older articles create a foundation of fundamental ideas on the subject, while recently 
published articles contribute with newer perspectives. However there is an inherent risk in 
using old articles as the ideas in the older articles could be outdated, this risk was reduced 
by choosing articles which had been referred to in more recent publications. 
 
The origin of the data collected also has to be considered. If the sources were to provide 
incorrect information the results generated would be misleading. The data used in this 
study is considered reliable as the World Bank and Transparency International are well 
respected organisations and data from these sources have been used in several previous 
studies on the subject. The World Bank development indicators and the Corruption 
Perceptions Index are therefore deemed to be reliable. However it is worth noting that the 
Corruption Perceptions Index is built on perceptions, which has been proven to have 
significant drawbacks (Bardhan, 1997).   
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5 Empirical findings 
This chapter presents the empirical findings and their statistical significance. The chapter 
commences with descriptive statistics regarding the econometric tests performed in the study. 
Thereafter, the main results of regression model are presented. 
 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
The sample, after losses, consists of 337 observations from thirty six   sub-Saharan 
countries. The model constructed fulfills the Gauss-Markov assumption and achieves a 
BLUE regression. It can therefore be stated that no estimator has lower variance, thus there 
is no alternative estimator that better carries out the regression. 
 
Our regression analysis will be conducted with fixed effects on both the cross-section and 
period observations. By conducting a Hausman test (see Table 2) and a Likelihood ratio 
test for redundant fixed effects (see Table 3) it can be shown that fixed effects is the 
optimal choice for our model; the prerequisites for using random effects have not been 
fulfilled as it cannot be said that we are drawing observations at random. The dataset 
concerns observations from countries and our sample of countries consist entirely of sub-
Saharan nations, thus it cannot be said that the sample has been drawn at random, due to 
the fact that the world consists of roughly 200 sovereign states; depending on definition. 
(Dougherty, 2011, p. 525) 
 
Table 2: Hausman test of initial regression (Table 14) 
 Chi-Squared Statistic Chi-Squared. Degrees 
of Freedom 
Prob. 
Cross-section random 19.0272 5 0.0019 
Period random 7.9652 5 0.1582 
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Table 3: Likelihood ratio test of initial regression (Table 14) 
 Statistic Degrees of Freedom Prob. 
Cross-Section F 4.0031 (35.286) 0.0000 
Cross-Section Chi-Square 134.3619 35 0.0000 
Period F 1.4560 (10.286) 0.1556 
Period Chi-Square 16.7343 10 0.0805 
Cross-Section/Period F 3.7067 (45.286) 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-
Squared 
154.8393 45 0.0000 
 
 
When analysing the correlation in our dataset we conclude that none of our explanatory 
variables show signs of multicollinearity, as no value exceeds 0.8 (see Table 1). Another 
multicollinearity test is achieved by performing step-by-step regressions (see Tables 10-
14) thus ascertaining if variables “poach” explanatory power from each other, an indication 
of multicollinearity. The Corruption variable experienced loss of explanatory power on the 
inclusion of the GDP/capita variable, which indicates collinearity. This was not unforeseen 
as GDP/capita to some extent acts as a proxy for institutional efficacy. As the correlation 
matrix refutes a correlation the possible multicollinearity was not seen to be an issue in our 
model. 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix 
 Inflation Corruption (FDI/GDP) Openness GDP growth GDP/capita 
Inflation 1.0 0.093820 0.2244 0.159659 0.136920 -0.036577 
Corruption  1.0 0,012841 -0.179036 0.060633 -0.602034 
(FDI/GDP)   1.0 0.275144 0.122678 0,121607 
Openness    1.0 0.010385 0.394646 
GDP growth     1.0 -0.039160 
GDP/capita      1.0 
 
The Durbin-Watson statistic produced (1.7806) (see Table 9) indicates no signs of 
autocorrelation (positive or negative), and should therefore have no implications for the 
LS-estimate. The values obtained in our regression show no signs of unit roots as values of 
the above mentioned were within limits. Though contemporaneous correlation, 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity were not apparent in our model, we have chosen to 
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weight the model using PCSE weights on the cross-section according to the discussion in 
section 4.3.3. 
 
The sample shows indications of normal distribution with a reasonably bell-shaped curve. 
Even though the residual distribution (see Graph 2) produced a high Jarque-Bera value, the 
value is considered low enough in relation to the number of observations in our sample. 
The level of probability further strengthens the assumption of normal distribution. We 
have thus determined that our sample is large enough to produce a normal distribution in 
the estimates, therefore the Gauss-Markov assumption of normal distribution holds.  
 
Graph 2: Residual distribution of regression output in Table 15 
 
 
 
An attempt to perform a regression with logarithmic values yielded unlikely results: 
despite calculating five year moving averages of all variables that assumed negative values 
(Inflation, GDP growth), many of the calculated averages were negative. It is not possible to 
calculate the logarithm of negative values thus many null values were generated, further 
unbalancing the dataset. After computing the squared values of all variables (except for 
corruption as it is already a somewhat abstract index) and performing regression analysis 
(see Table 5) with both level and squared variables, it would appear that the model suffers 
somewhat from non-linearity. This was however not apparent after graphical analysis (see 
Graph 5). 
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Probability  0.000000
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Table 5: Linearity test 
Total panel observations: 337 
Dependent variable: Inflation 
Independent variables: Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
β0 8.4038 
(7.2148) 
Corruption -0.0540 
(0.0852) 
(FDI/GDP) -0.9371*** 
(0.2956) 
(FDI/GDP)2 0.0708*** 
(0.0140) 
Openness 13.1800* 
(7.2139) 
Openness2 -4.3330 
(3.9023) 
GDP growth 0.3864** 
(0.1651) 
GDP growth2 -0.0030 
(0.0093) 
(GDP/capita) -0.0024** 
(0.0009) 
(GDP/capita) 2 1.95E-07* 
(8.59E-08) 
Model R2 0.1603 
Model Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 
Statistical Significance at ***1%, **5%, *10% 
 
 
The relationship between inflation and corruption has been tested in a variety of studies 
(see Section 3.1) however the choice of dependent variable has varied. One could conclude: 
given the economic literature on the subject, that corruption and inflation affect one 
another and that no clear causal direction exists (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Causality of Inflation and Corruption 
Author(s) Dependent variable Independent variable 
Al-Mahrubi (2000) Inflation Corruption 
Akça et al. (2012) Corruption Inflation 
Braun and Di Tella (2000) Corruption Inflation variability 
Samimi et al. (2012) Inflation Corruption 
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We did not reach conclusive results when controlling for robustness in our results. In the 
balanced panel model (see Table 7) Corruption and (FDI/GDP) were both shown to be 
significant correlated with Inflation. The results of the income group robustness test (see 
Table 8) were inconclusive; different variables proved to be important determinants of 
Inflation depending on income level. The corollary of the robustness tests is that our model 
cannot be said to be fully robust thus implying a weakness in our model. 
 
Table 7: Robustness test using balanced panel, fixed effects in period and cross-section and 
PCSE weights (cross-sectional) 
 
Total panel observations: 132 
Cross-section weights: PCSE 
Dependent Variable: Inflation 
Independent Variables: Coefficient 
(S.E) 
Corruption 0.5697* 
(0.2918) 
(FDI/GDP) -0.9165** 
(0.4512) 
Openness -1.3952 
(12.8790) 
GDP/capita 0.0008 
(0.0012) 
GDP growth 0.2020 
(0.3035) 
Β0 -27.1048 
(20.8084) 
Model R2 0.4860 
Model Prob (F-Statistic) 0.0000 
Effects specification: Cross-section fixed 
 Period fixed 
Statistical significance at *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% 
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Table 8: Robustness test for income groups, fixed effects in period and cross-section and 
PCSE weights (cross-sectional) 
 
Total panel observations: 170 98 69 
Cross-section weights: PCSE PCSE PCSE 
Income group: Low Lower  middle Upper middle 
 
Dependent Variable: Inflation Inflation Inflation 
Independent Variables: Coefficient 
(S.E) 
Coefficient 
(S.E) 
Coefficient 
(S.E) 
Corruption 0.2815 
(0.1812) 
0.5392* 
(0.3158) 
0.2304 
(0.4198) 
(FDI/GDP) -0.1587 
(0.1561) 
-0.5388 
(0.4208) 
2.0543*** 
(0.4388) 
Openness 7.7577* 
(4.6115) 
-19.4000 
(15.3030) 
28.9915 
(25.7913) 
GDP/capita 0.0278** 
(0.0131) 
0.0023 
(0.0060) 
0.0036 
(0.0034) 
GDP growth 0.0761 
(0.1560) 
-0.2908 
(0.5827) 
-1.1135* 
(0.6166) 
Β0 -27.5035* 
(15.8653) 
-11.5104 
(25.1123) 
-55.3405 
(48.5587) 
Model R2 0.3747 0.5906 0.7177 
Model Prob (F-Statistic) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Effects specification: Cross-section fixed Cross-section fixed Cross-section fixed 
 Period fixed Period fixed Period fixed 
Statistical significance at *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%  
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5.2 Results 
Below we present the results of the regression performed in EViews 7.1 using Inflation as 
the dependent variable. The results below have been tested and corrected according to the 
discussion above (see Section 5.1). The table below (Table 9) shows the regression made 
using fixed effects in both period and cross-sections in the panel least squares model with 
PCSE cross-sectional weights, thus creating robust clustered standard errors. 
 
Table 9: Regression output, fixed effects in period and cross-section and PCSE weights 
(cross-sectional) 
Total panel observations: 337 
Cross-section weights: PCSE 
Dependent Variable: Inflation 
Independent Variables: Coefficient 
(S.E) 
Corruption 0.3309** 
(0.1574) 
(FDI/GDP) 0.5876** 
(0.2555) 
Openness 7.3372 
(5.7141) 
GDP/capita -0.0018 
(0.0013) 
GDP growth -0.0832 
(0.2141) 
Β0 -17.7550 
(12.7905) 
Model R2 0.4237 
Model Prob (F-Statistic) 0.0000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.7806 
Effects specification: Cross-section fixed 
 Period fixed 
Statistical significance at *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% 
 
Corruption and (FDI/GDP) were both shown to be positively and significantly correlated 
with Inflation. Even though not significant, the GDP/capita and GDP growth coefficients 
were indicative of negative relationships with Inflation. Openness was not shown to be 
significantly correlated with Inflation however the coefficient suggests a positive 
relationship between the variables. 
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6 Analysis 
This chapter interprets the findings from the previous chapter with regard to the theoretical 
framework. It therefore constitutes the main product of this study. 
 
It is no coincidence that sub-Saharan Africa, a region fraught by conflict and instability, has 
not been the focus of much previous economic study. The reason for this is a grave lack of 
data concerning certain countries; statistical reporting seems to disappear in the face of 
conflict. This has had consequences for our study, forcing a smaller index of countries and a 
shorter timespan than otherwise planned. Furthermore the data that has been used is 
unbalanced which could affect the regressions’ outcomes; the unbalanced data could cause 
a bias as the periods corresponding to the greatest instability and therefore highest 
corruption and/or inflation may be those that have been omitted. Friedman (1963) asserts 
that funding wars is one of the most common reasons for seigniorage (p. 9). In recent years 
as the region has become more stable, data has become more complete; this will enable 
more widely-based research in the future. 
 
Though most data was collected from the World Bank and is thought to be reliable, the 
corruption data was taken from Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI). TI is a highly reputable organisation; however the index is built on 
perceptions, which traditionally adjust slowly to new developments. Policy changes aimed 
at addressing corruption can take many years to implement and be seen to have an effect, 
which could account for the low variation in the CPI data. The low variability in the CPI 
index could have had major implications for our study as we attempted to analyse the 
relationship between this variable and a highly fluctuating inflation index. To achieve 
further robustness other variables that also measure corruption could have been included; 
however that might have introduced multicollinearity into the model. Other such variables 
are hard to measure and quantify and were therefore omitted (see Bardhan, 1997; 
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Svensson, 2005). We would have liked to build other models using alternative measures of 
corruption however this was not possible due to insufficient data. 
 
Corruption was shown to have a significant and positive effect on inflation. This result was 
predicted by theory and many previous studies; however there seems to be some 
heterogeneity that is not captured by the result. The mechanism by which the positive 
relationship occurs cannot be empirically proven however this paper hypothesises, in 
accordance with Al-Mahrubi’s (2000) research, that corruption has many negative 
implications for the tax base, thus incentivising seigniorage as a government revenue 
stream. The positive coefficient obtained through regression analysis can be explained by 
theories that highlight how corruption erodes the tax base, and therefore makes an 
inflation tax more attractive. Al-Mahrubi (2000) highlights several ways in which 
corruption contributes to inflation due to tax base depletion. Simultaneous corruption and 
inflation bring about a negative spiral in which governments’ costs surge, whereas revenue 
steadily decreases. Costs increase due to embezzlement, but also as a result of the 
monetary costs of inflation and increased import costs due to real currency depreciation 
(World Bank, 1997; Friedman, 1963; Burda and Wyplosz, 2009). 
 
The results obtained through regression analysis give further weight to theoretical 
assumptions surrounding the relationship between inflation and corruption. Al-Mahrubi 
(2000) theorises that corruption incentivises black market activity. Friedman (1963) 
argues that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, however many 
attribute it to increased price-levels set by profit seeking firms, thus governments may try 
to suppress price-levels and inflation. An inability to openly charge market prices may tend 
to force firms into the parallel economy, however a large underground economy further 
shrinks the tax base creating further motives for seigniorage and, in turn, inflation. 
Furthermore inflation tax/seigniorage may be the only way to tax activity in the parallel 
economy (Mankiw, 1987). Corruption, too, creates motives for businesses to move to the 
parallel sector as a result of rising business costs (Svensson, 2005). 
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Robustness tests do not categorically strengthen the hypothesis of a positive correlation 
between inflation and corruption. As a result of colonial history and current political and 
social turbulence, countries in Africa have widely ranging institutional frameworks, or lack 
thereof. The corollary of this diversity within sub-Saharan Africa is that small reference 
groups are ill-equipped to provide broad truths. The variables shown to contribute to 
inflation differed distinctly between the different income groups in the robustness test. 
 
Neither GDP/capita nor GDP growth showed to be significantly correlated with inflation 
therefore we cannot comment with certainty on their relationship. The variables are 
indicators of not only development level but also general state of governmental aptitude; 
both showed negative coefficients thus indicating that a less “well-functioning” government 
contributes to inflation. This is in line with Friedman’s (1963) theory that inflation is an 
attractive source of funding for governments lacking political legitimacy, this as inflation is 
the only tax that can be levied without legislation. Furthermore difficulties in raising tax 
revenue, perhaps exacerbated by low GDP levels, can be alleviated through seigniorage as 
money has no substitute; therefore no one can “escape” taxation (Friedman, 1963). This 
becomes an especially pertinent issue in unstable societies and economies that are served 
by weak or corrupt government institutions. The GDP/capita and GDP growth variables 
seemed to have acted as proxies for institutional efficiency, illustrating in accordance with 
work by Blackburn, Neanidis and Haque (2008) that corruption in the public sector 
increases the need for seigniorage financing. No index of institutional efficiency was 
included as this would probably have been collinear with corruption and the available data 
was in any case insufficient. 
 
Regression analysis showed that FDI as a percentage of GDP has a statistically significant 
positive effect on inflation. This stands in contrast to Svensson’s (2005) hypothesis which 
states that the value of capital and other assets is eroded through inflation, deterring 
investment. Likewise he asserts that the social costs of corruption include the inefficient 
allocation of resources, including the disincentive for business investments causing capital 
flight and reduced FDI (Svensson, 2005). Our hypothesis that FDI acts as a proxy for 
investor confidence in the face of macroeconomic (in)stability due to inflation and other 
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factors cannot be proved. Despite the findings of our regression, a combination of 
corruption and inflation is very damaging to the investment climate as a result of inflation 
tax, diminishing value of capital, monetary costs of corruption and impediments to doing 
business such as red-tape and insufficient property rights (Svensson, 2005; Blackburn, 
Neanidis and Haque, 2008). Therefore a positive relationship must result from FDI being an 
indicator or proxy for some omitted variable. It is possible that a positive coefficient is 
indicative of increased foreign capital inflows causing inflation due to malfunctioning 
capital markets, or other unanticipated links. 
 
Openness showed to have a positive though non-significant effect on inflation, the 
interpretation of this is unclear but presumably this variable’s explanatory power as a 
measure of vulnerability to external markets was stronger than as a proxy for ease of doing 
business. Similarly, the variable FDI (% of GDP) might act as an indicator of volatile foreign 
capital markets and not investor confidence. Domestic institutions such as financial and 
labour markets could reduce the vulnerability to external shocks that openness causes 
(Loayza and Raddatz, 2006). We tentatively conclude that better functioning financial 
markets that e.g. absorb excess foreign currency would reduce the negative impact that 
seems to contribute to inflation. 
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7 Conclusions 
This final chapter summarises our findings and makes suggestions for policy and future study. 
 
7.1 Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the relationship between corruption and 
inflation in sub-Saharan Africa by means of an empirical study. We aimed to fill a gap in the 
economic literature by applying relevant theories to this specific region. With reference to 
previous research within the topic area, we were able to theorise about the relationship 
and reached statistically significant results through econometric regression analysis. The 
findings of Al-Marhubi’s (2000) seminal research on the relationship between corruption 
and inflation have therefore been strengthened by our findings. 
 
Our hypothesis was that corruption and inflation are positively correlated as the former 
creates motives for inflation-fuelling seigniorage. Our findings suggest that corruption 
exacts a large monetary penalty on an economy in the form of direct costs such as 
embezzlement but also through the tax base depletion caused by diminished investment 
and growing parallel markets. Governments are therefore forced to seek other sources of 
funding, with seigniorage as an attractive alternative source of revenue. 
 
Inflation does seem to be affected adversely by institutional inefficiency as illustrated by 
the many control variables that act as proxies for governmental efficacy. Notably both 
(FDI/GDP) and Openness were shown to be positively correlated with inflation, indicating 
that vulnerability to the effects of foreign capital flows contributes to inflation as a result of 
underdeveloped financial regulation. Though statistically insignificant, both GDP/capita 
and GDP growth, telling indicators of development level and of a functioning economy (also 
with regard to tax revenue), were negatively correlated with inflation. One could further 
speculate that countries at a higher developmental level have less need to engage in 
seigniorage activities in order to fund government expenditure. 
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The causality of the relationship between inflation and corruption is unclear as has been 
demonstrated by the many previous studies within the field (see Table 6). It is however 
apparent that institutional effectiveness and a stable macroeconomy contribute to both 
inflation control and corruption control as they tend to create environments where 
governments can enforce laws, regulate markets and are able to effect credible inflation 
targeting. 
 
The findings of this thesis are thus that corruption contributes positively to inflation in sub-
Saharan Africa, possibly as it creates seigniorage motives for governments struggling to 
fund public expenditure as a result of the tax base eroding effects of both corruption and 
inflation. Further study is necessary to determine the mechanism linking corruption and 
inflation. Seigniorage is hard to measure, especially due the lack of institutional 
transparency in the government apparatus in the region studied. Due to the fast changing 
economic, political and institutional environment in the region, future studies will 
presumably to be able to take advantage of greater data availability and reliability which 
will hopefully generate more conclusive results: in turn enabling policy prescriptions for 
combatting corruption and thus inflation. 
 
The policy prescriptions resulting from this paper concern the need to create independent 
and accountable institutions, notably central banks with credible inflation targeting. These 
measures would contribute to a better business and investment climate thus promoting 
economic growth which increases tax revenue. Furthermore institutional development 
must take place in order to regulate financial and other markets hence reducing external 
vulnerability. Creating a functioning judicial system that eliminates corruption and 
guarantees property rights, would stimulate investment and promote growth. 
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7.2 Further studies 
In order to gain further insights into the relationship between inflation and corruption 
more studies in this field will be necessary. Due to the unclear causality between the 
variables, study of the relationship using corruption as the dependent variable would be 
interesting. As more data becomes available as African countries develop, future studies 
will be able to take advantage of balanced data for a wider range of countries.  
 
Analysis would benefit from the inclusion of alternate measures of corruption as this would 
achieve greater robustness in the results. The ability to measure seigniorage would have 
strengthened our hypothesis as our study was only able to make assumptions regarding 
the relationship between corruption and seigniorage. Furthermore an index measuring 
Central Bank independence could have given further insights into the relationship between 
inflation and corruption in the public domain. 
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9 Appendix 
Below we present the process leading to our final results, including residual 
distribution graphs and econometric tests. We also provide some background 
information about the region. 
 
 
 
Table 10: Regression output: Inflation and Corruption 
Total panel observations: 337 
Dependent Variable: Inflation 
Independent Variables: Coefficient 
(S.E) 
Corruption 0.1141* 
(0.0662) 
Β0 2.0505 
(4.7228) 
Model R2 0.0088 
Model Prob (F-Statistic) 0.0855 
Statistical Significance at ***1%, **5%, *10% 
 
 
 
Table 11: Regression output: Inflation, Corruption and (FDI/GDP) 
Total panel observations: 337 
Dependent Variable: Inflation 
Independent Variables: Coefficient 
(S.E) 
Corruption 0.1107* 
(0.0646) 
(FDI/GDP) 0.5303*** 
(0.1261) 
Β0 -0.0001 
(4.6351) 
Model R2 0.0586 
Model Prob (F-Statistic) 0.0000 
Statistical significance at *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% 
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Table 12: Regression output: Inflation, Corruption, (FDI/GDP) and Openness 
Total panel observations: 337 
Dependent Variable: Inflation 
Independent Variables: Coefficient 
(S.E) 
Corruption 0.1392** 
(0.0654) 
(FDI/GDP) 0.4456*** 
(0.1306) 
Openness 4.6907** 
(2.0395) 
Β0 -5.1973 
(5.1301) 
Model R2 0.0733 
Model Prob (F-Statistic) 0.0000 
Statistical significance at *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% 
 
 
 
Table 13: Regression output: Inflation, Corruption, (FDI/GDP), Openness and GDP/capita 
Total panel observations: 337 
Dependent Variable: Inflation 
Independent Variables: Coefficient 
(S.E) 
Corruption 0.0889 
(0.0809) 
(FDI/GDP) 0.4547*** 
(0.1309) 
Openness 5.4610** 
(2.1662) 
GDP/capita -0.0004 
(0.0004) 
Β0 -1.6197 
(6.1509) 
Model R2 0.0764 
Model Prob (F-Statistic) 0.0000 
Statistical significance at *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% 
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Table 14: Regression output: Inflation, Corruption, (FDI/GDP), Openness, GDP/capita and 
GDP growth – initial regression 
Total panel observations: 337 
Dependent Variable: Inflation 
Independent Variables: Coefficient 
(S.E) 
Corruption 0.08347 
(0.0806) 
(FDI/GDP) 0.4225*** 
(0.1313) 
Openness 5.4863** 
(2.1564) 
GDP/capita -0.0004 
(0.0003) 
GDP growth 0.2843** 
(0.1414) 
Β0 -2.4995 
(6.1386) 
Model R2 0.0876 
Model Prob (F-Statistic) 0.0000 
Statistical significance at *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% 
 
 
 
 
Graph 3: Residual distribution of regression output in Table 14 
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Table 15: Regression output, initial regression with fixed effects in period and cross-section 
Total panel observations: 337 
Dependent Variable: Inflation 
Independent Variables: Coefficient 
(S.E) 
Corruption 0.3309* 
(0.1894) 
(FDI/GDP) 0.5876*** 
(0.1494) 
Openness 7.3372 
(5.0384) 
GDP/capita -0.0018* 
(0.0010) 
GDP growth -0.0832 
(0.1527) 
Β0 -17.7550 
(14.0971) 
Model R2 0.4237 
Model Prob (F-Statistic) 0.0000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.7806 
Effects specification: Cross-section fixed 
 Period fixed 
Statistical significance at *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% 
 
 
 
Graph 4: Income groups 
 
 Source: World Bank (2013) 
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Graph 5: Graphical linearity test of (FDI/GDP) against Inflation 
 
 
 
   Source: World Bank (2013) 
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